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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LIMITS AND
LIMITATIONS
By JOSEPH B. LEDERLEITNER*
While time limits or statutes of limitations are commonplace in the practice of law, attention usually focuses upon a particular rule or application rather than upon the whole area of
the law of limitations. As is true in many areas of social and
political interest, some time-honored legal concepfs are being reexamined and several are changing. Governmental immunity
in tort,' manufacturer's strict liability in tort,2 and indemnity
by operation of law, 3 are a few illustrations of modern attempts
to keep the substantive law of Illinois abreast of the considered
needs of the people. Frequent revisions of the Illinois Civil Practice Act and rules of court and case law changes on topics such
as long arm jurisdiction 4 seek the same result in the procedural
law. The concept of time limit or statute of limitations operates
in both the substantive and procedural law and finds application
and involvement in a large number of cases across many varied
fields of law. This renders reexamination more difficult and the
overall development is less apparent. This paper attempts to
survey the law of limits and limitations in Illinois.
Generally, the concept of time limit or statute of limitations
is neither complicated or unfamiliar. While it is involved in
actions at common law or under statutory remedies, chancery
also effectuates a similar concept under the doctrine of laches
or the maxim that equity follows the law. Basically, the statute
of limitations specifies the time within which a particular action
must be brought or right asserted. While the limitation for
many of the real and personal actions are set forth in the
General Statute of Limitations, the statute is not all inclusive.7,
Some statutes creating causes of action specify their own limitations.6 Where the enabling statute specifies the time within
* J.D., B.S., Northwestern University, associate partner at Pretzel,
Stouffer, Nolan & Rooney, instructor at John Marshall Law School and
Lawyers Institute, member of Appellate Lawyers Association, former member of Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instruction that drafted I.P.I.
I See Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Il. 2d 11,
163 N.E.2d 89 (1959) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85 (1967).
2

Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).

3Muhlbauer v. Kruzel, 39 Ill. 2d 226, 234 N.E.2d 790 (1968).
4 Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
5 ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
.3 (1967).
No attempt will be made to deal with

limitations in the field of conflict of laws.
6 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§1-2 (1967) (Wrongful Death Act); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 43, §135 (1967)

(Dramshop Act).
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which the action must be brought as a condition of liability, the
time limitation may be construed to be an integral part of the
substantive law which must be pleaded and satisfied by the
plaintiff. An example of this is in the action for wrongful death
under the Illinois Injuries Act.7 Where the time limitation is a
general one and is not construed to be a condition of liability,
the limitation is procedural, and it can be waived if not raised
in due time.8 Whether or not the rationale was influenced by
the common law pleas in bar or abatement, sophisticated jurists
were wont to verbalize the point by stating that the statute of
limitations merely barred the remedy and did not extinguish
the right.9
MANNER OF APPLYING THE BAR

Apart from the substantive conditions of liability, not every
procedural limitation which is timely asserted is necessarily
effective to bar an action. The avowed purpose of the ordinary

statute of limitations is to avoid the litigation of stale claims
after opportunity for fruitful investigation and preparation of
defense is past or likely to be greatly impaired.1° It is thus held

that if one has timely notice or knowledge of a claim, the statute
of limitation will not be applied to bar the addition of a late
action. 1 On the other hand, neither staleness nor lack of timely
notice or knowledge will preclude suit where the plaintiff is a
minor, though a claim asserted within the second year after
reaching majority for an injury sustained in the first year
of life may be very stale indeed.12 In the instance of insanity
or mental illness, the action brought may be not only stale but
ancient. Moreover, the incompetence attending insanity or men7 Wilson v. Tromly, 404 111. 307, 89 N.E.2d 22 (1949)
(Provision of
Limitation Act has no application to action under Injuries Act) ; Shelton v.
Woolsey, 20 11. App. 2d 401, 156 N.E.2d 241 (1959) (General Limitations
Act does not apply to action under Dramshop Act).
1 Shapiro v. Kartsonis, 330 Ill. App. 299. 71 N.E.2d 356 (1947) ; Stanley
v. Chastek, 34 Ill. App. 2d 220, 180 N.E.2d 512 (1962) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, §48(e) (1967).
0 Glenn v. McDavid. 316 Ill. App. 130, 44 N.E.2d 84 (1942),
also indicating that the defense may not be asserted by a stranger. Sec, a.o Reery
v. Hurd, 295 I1. App. 124, 14 N.E.2d 656 (1938), indicating that a barred
remedy cannot be revived.
10 Mosby v. Michael Reese Hosp., 49 Ill. App. 2d 336, 199 N.E.2d 633
(1964).
11 Geneva Constr. Co. v. Martin Transfer & Storage Co., 4 Ill. 2d 273,
122 N.E.2d 540 (1954). In permitting the joinder of an employee's action
for personal injuries to the employer's action for reimbursement more than
four years after the date of occurrence, the court said that statutes of
limitation must be construed in the light of their objective and that purpose
was fully served in the case at bar. Echales v. Krasny, 12 I1. App. 2d 530.
1319 N.E.2d 767 (1957) (allowing widow to intervene into employer's action
for reimbursement and bring action for wrongful death almost five years
after date of death).
12 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 8.,
§22 (1967); Stanczyvk v. Keefe, '84 F.2d 707
(7th Cir. 1967).
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tal illness is not deemed to attend mental retardation for purpose
of the statute extending time limitation."3 In arriving at this
conclusion, the court was impressed by the fact that the retarded
person read, worked, drove; was alert and cooperative; had
memory, sense and understanding.
The filing of a timely complaint does not always put at rest
all further problems with limitations. Normally, a claim barred
by limitations cannot be asserted through the subterfuge of
amendment.14 However, much has already been done with the
principle of "relation back" in order to permit amendments under
certain conditions after the initial time period has expired.1- Except for mistake of name and the like, "relation back" is not
generally employed to permit the bringing in of new defendants
by amendment after the statute of limitations has run.1 As between existing and proper parties, however, even barred counterclaims of a specified nature (usually those arising from the same
transaction or occurrence) may be brought either initially or by
amendment regardless of limitations.17
Avoidance of the bar of the statute has also been aided by
the classic doctrines of estoppel. Estoppel exists as a bar to a
statute of limitations independent of those things set forth in
the statute itself as causing its suspension.1" Settlement discussions which lull plaintiff into a false sense of security estop the
negotiator from raising the bar.19 Normally, a statute of limitations is applied prospectively only, 2° and while the mathematics
of computing time is not particularly difficult, the proper points
of reference for the calculation as to when the action accrues are
not always easily identified and often depend on the nature of
the liability. For example. if the recovery sought is for a direct
personal injury, it is said that the action must be brought in two
years, whether the remedy is tort or contract; but in medical
13 Peach v. Peach, 73 Ill. App. 2d 72, 218 N.E.2d 504 (1966).
The
court noted that the mentally retarded person was able to read, play pinochle, drive a car, work on a farm, maintain a checking account; was alert,
cooperative and had memory sense and understanding.
14 Pasos v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 17 FrD. RULES Si.
15a.34, Case 1
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
15 FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §46 (1967).
16 Horan v. Brenner, 57 I1. App. 2d 83, 206 N.E.2d 488 (1965) (holding
that where plaintiff had facts concerning the identity of defendant but did
not seek to have corporation made defendant until after limitation period
had expired, the action against the corporation was barred): Marsden v.
Neisius, 5 Il. App. 2d 396, 126 N.E.2d 44 (1955) (amended complaint correcting misnomer or mistake in name rather than mistake in identity held
to relate back and was not time barred).
17 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, §18 (1967) ; Carnahan v. McKinley, 80 I1. App.
2d 318. 224 N.E.2d 297 (1967).
,IS
Sabath v. Morris Handler Co., 102 IH. App. 2d 218.
243 N.E.2d 723
(1968).
1")Devlin v. Want roba. 72 Ill. App. 2d 383. 218 N.E.2d 496 (1966) ; Reat
v. Illinois Cent. R.R.. 47 II. App. 2d 267, 197 N.E.2d 860 (1964).
20 Tatge v. Hyd. 84 P1. App. 2d 310. 228 N.E.2d 179 (1967).
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malpractice, if the. action is on the oral contract, the limit is
five years.-" The two year limit for personal injury actions holds
true in products cases where the maiufacture was much earlier. .'

Generally speaking, the action accrues and the time runs from
last act necessary to render the actor liable.2

AvomING BAR WHERE ACTION CONCEALED
If circumstances operate to obscure the action, courts have
been loathe to enforce the bar and have said so in no uncertain

terms.24

In Simoniz v. J. Emil Anderson & Sons, Inc., ' 5 a com-

plaint was filed to recover from a contractor for negligence in the
performance of the work after it had been accepted. In holding

the action barred by the five year limitation, the court said:
It is asserted by the plaintiff that while the wrongful conduct
took place in 1952 and 1953, no notice or knowledge of the wrongful conduct came to the attention of the plaintiff until the damages
actually occurred in 1962. In seeking to meet the issues directly,
Simoniz asserts that its cause of action was not barred by the
general statute of limitations in actions governing recovery for
damage to property. It recognizes that the general statute of limi-

tations for actions to recover for damage of property provides that
the suit must be commenced within five years after the cause of
action accrues. It is contended by appellant, however, that insofar
as such statute is concerned the cause of action did not accrue on

September 20, 1953, when the building was completed and accepted
but on August 6, 1962, when the roof collapsed, and as a consequence the action was filed well within the five-year period provided by such statute. '-'
The court refuted this contention, stating:
Since there was no fraud or concealment on the part of any of
the defendants and since the Illinois precedents and the statute
of limitations as expressed in this State do not justify the
adoption of the "know or ought to know" rule in cases such as

we have before us, we must conclude that the trial court correctly
determined that the action was barred by the five year statute of
limitations applicable in this case. We have noted that the legislature, when confronted with the problem of the time of accrual of
a cause of action in the malpractice cases, saw fit only to amend
that act and limit it to malpractice cases. The amended act permits
the injured party to count the time for commencement of action
21 Doerr v. Villate, 74 Ill. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966), allegation that pursuant to oral agreement that defendant's physician performed
certain operation and made certain warranties respecting sterilization in reliance on which relations were had resulting in birth of retarded child was
under five year statute of limitations rather than two year statute of limitations.
22 Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 334, 236 N.E.2d 125
(1968).

23 Id.

24 Mosby v. Michael Reese Hosp., 49 Ill. App. 2d 336, 199 N.E.2d

633 (1964); Simoniz Co. v. J. Emil Anderson & Sons, 81 Ill. App. 2d 428,
225 N.E.2d 161 (1967).
25 81 Ill. App. 2d 428, 225 N.E.2d 161 (1967).
26 Id. at 432-33, 225 N.E.2d at 163-64.
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from the time he knows or should have known of the negligent
act, but even in such case, the legislature limited the potential
claim to a maximum of 10 years from the date of the incident
giving rise to the malpractice claim. :7
Continuing the court said:
To seek to modify the limitation act by use of the "know or ought
to know" principle in this case cannot be justified on the basis of
precedents. In theory, damage actions would never be completely
limited but might go on for 25 or 50 or even 100 years when it
would be impossible to meet or cope with demands made. Modifying or changing the applicable time limitations, on the basis of the
precedents in this State, must be left to the legislature.2
To alleviate the hardship of the bar in cases of fraudulent concealment, the legislature long ago passed a statute which postponed accrual of the cause of action to date of discovery and extends the time limit to five years. Section 23 of the Limitations
Act provides:
If a person liable to an action fraudulently conceals the cause of
such action from the knowledge of the person entitled thereto, the
action may be commenced at any time within five years after the
discovers that he has such cause
person entitled to bring the same
2 9
of action, and not afterwards.
In the recent case of Stein v. Baum,3° the appellate court indicated that before section 23 will extend the statute of limitation
there must be both concealment and deception. Carmen Stein
had been a patient of Dr. Baum at Presbyterian Hospital, where
she received radiation treatments for carcinoma of the cervix.
She pleaded that she received excessive doses and that the effects were not apparent until a later date. While the radiation
therapy was apparently successful against the cancer, it caused
radiation burns in the affected areas. In holding the limitations
not extended and the action barred, the appellate court noted that
the treatments were prescribed pursuant to a diagnosis of cancer
and that the patient was forewarned that the radiation treatments would cause certain effects and that these had cleared up
sufficiently to enable her to undergo an operation some two
months after the treatment had stopped. During the post-operative treatment, her complaints were examined and at first they
were attributed to the operation. Later they were related to the
prior radiation treatments. In the court's opinion, the statements
of the doctor appeared to be no more than medical opinions and
disclosed no intent to deceive or conceal. Summary judgment
against the patient was therefore affirmed and the existence or
non-existence of fraudulent concealment was not an issue of fact.
Id. at 437, 225 N.E.2d at 166.
Id. at 438, 225 N.E.2d at 166.
29 ILL. Rzy. STAT. ch. 83, §23 (1967).
30 Stein v. Baum, 89 I1. App. 2d 142, 232 N.E.2d 96 (1967).
27

28
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"Knew or Should Have Known" Rule
Concealment, however, need not result from a doctor's word
but may result from the operation" itself. Since the statute of
limitations runs from injury rather than discovery, in Mosby
v. Michael Reese Hospital3' a claim was held barred where a
surgical needle left in the body during an operation was not
discovered until after the statute had run.
The appellate court reluctantly upheld the bar, stating:
We cannot do what the legislature had failed to do and the order
dismissing the plaintiff's complaint must be affirmed. We are not
pleased with this result. The statute barred the plaintiff's claim
before she knew she had been wronged. The defendant's admitted
negligence was not ascertainable to her - she presumably was
under anesthetic when it took place - and she certainly has not
slept on her rights. It would be more equitable if the commencement of the limitation period were delayed until she discovered
the reason for her illness, but the statute does not 32permit the
construction necessary to obtain this equitable result.
The Legislature responded with section 22.1 which provides:
Whenever in the course of any medical, dental, surgical or other
professional treatment or operation, any foreign substance other
than flesh, blood or bone, is introduced and is negligently permitted
to remain within the body of a living human person, causing harm,
the period of limitation for filing an action for damages does not
begin until the person actually knows or should have known of the
facts of harm and damage to his body; provided that no such action
may be 33commenced more than 10 years after such treatment or operation.
This statute was involved in the recent case of Mathis v.
Hejna.34 In the Mathis case, a myelogram was performed upon
the plaintiff during the course of which some contrast media
called pantopaque was injected into the spinal canal. At the
conclusion of the myelogram, the pantopaque was withdrawn,
but it was alleged that not all of it was withdrawn and some of
it was permitted to remain in the body, allegedly causing arachThe plaintiff alleged that pantopaque is a foreign
noiditis.
substance, other than flesh, blood or bone, and that she was unaware of the defendant's negligence until within a period of less
than two years prior to suit. The trial court held that pantopaque is not a "foreign substance" within the meaning of section
22.1 and dismissed the complaint as barred by the two-year
statute of limitations. The defendants argued that the statute
only applied to items unwittingly left in the body and did not
apply to procedures by which something is injected and some
part of it remains. The appellate court noted that pantopaque
3149 Ill. App. 2d 336, 199 N.E.2d 633 (1964).

32 Id. at 342, 199 N.E.2d at 636.
33

ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83, §22.1 (1967).

'4Mathis

v. Hejma, 109 Ill. App. 2d 356, 248 N.E.2d 767 (1969).
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does not lose its identity in the body, and while medically it is
seldom possible or desirable to remove the material completely,
the latter was a fit subject of proof. The complaint having alleged that some pantopaque was permitted to remain through
negligence, it was held to be reversible error to dismiss the complaint. In doing so, the appellate court interpreted the statute
as follows:
Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 83, §22.1 (1965) was adopted to achieve the more
equitable result as suggested by the court in Mosby, that the cause
of action accrues when the party "knew or should have known" of
the injury . . . The legislative intent in enacting Ill. Rev. Stats.,
C83, §22.1, was to adopt the "knew or should have known" rule in
malpractice cases. If the legislature intended the statute to
apply only to those cases in which sponges, needles, clamps and
like items are negligently left in the body of a patient, as the
defendants contend, they would have chosen different wording to
express that intent.
In Prince v. Trustees of University of Pennsylvania, the court
in dicta discussed the purpose of the 'knew or should have known'
rule. The court stated:
The purpose of the "discovery rule" is clear: it is to prevent
the plaintiff from being penalized unfairly for failing to redress an injury, the cause of which he could not reasonably
have known.
The Illinois statute provides, in part, "any foreign substance
other than flesh, blood or bone." . . .

. We think the facts, as

pleaded, come within the technical definition of the statute as well
as the object and purpose of the statute. "Any" is defined as being
one indiscriminately of whatever kind. "Foreign" is an adjective
used to modify substance. "Other than" has been construed to
create an exception. Although "substance" is not explicitly defined,
it is defined by implication. "Substance" is any matter or thing
other than flesh, blood or bone. Since pantopaque is a substance
other than flesh, blood or bone, we hold it is a foreign substance
within the meaning of the statute3
OTHER LIMITS
After the first action is filed within the original or extended
time limit, most cases probably proceed to a judgment or settlement which ends the litigation. The plaintiff, however, may
suffer a nonsuit or a dismissal or other similar adverse result,
which is not a legal bar to further proceedings in which event
the law permits the commencement of a "new" action within one
year.38

The new action should be the same as the first action.37

There is some indication also that the nonsuit involved should be
85 Id. at 360-61, 248 N.E.2d at 769-70.
REv. STAT. ch. 82. §24 (a) (1967). If the judgment is a bar, this
refiling statute does not apply. Bonney v. Stoughton, 122 11. 536, 13 N.E.
38 ILL.

833 (1887).

37 Butterman v. Steiner, 343 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1965).
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an involuntary one. s , A dismissal for want of prosecution,
though often voluntary, has been held to be a nonsuit allowing
a refiling.3 9 It has also been applied in the case of a federal
4
court dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. 0
Though the purpose of the refiling statute is to avoid disposition of cases on grounds not involving the merits of the
controversy, a dismissal for violation of discovery rules is not
within the statute permitting a refiling.41 Furthermore, the
statute does not permit the repeated commencement of nonsuited
actions.42 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 273 now provides that,
unless otherwise specified by order of dismissal or a statute,
an involuntary dismissal other than a dismissal for lack of jurisparty, operates
diction, improper venue or lack of indispensable
4
as an adjudication upon the merits. 3
Other limitations exist which may be ostensibly procedural
rather than substantive but are actually jurisdictional as in
the case of the time for seeking post judgment relief during" or
after the expiration of modern equivalent of term time 45 and in
There are also actions which
the filing of a notice of appeal.
seem not to have a specific time limitation such as the action for
declaratory judgment. - In other actions of a secondary nature,
such as indemnity, the five year limit does not begin to run until
If the plaintiff dies
payment is made in the primary action.4
before the expiration of the time limited for bringing an action
which survives death, then the time for bringing the action
against the deceased's representatives is extended to one year
from date of death.9 On the other hand, if the defendant dies
before the expiration of the time limited for bringing the action
which survives death, then, the deceased's representatives may
be sued within 9 months of the issuance of the representatives'
letters, but the statute does not specify when letters must be
sought. If death occurs after the action is brought and it is
one that survives, the motion to substitute deceased's representa8 Koch v. Sheppard, 223 Ill. 172, 79 N.E. 52 (1906).
39 Casillas v. Rosengren, 86 Il. App. 2d 139, 229 N.E.2d 141

(1967)
Patrick v. Burgess Norton Mfg. Co., 56 Ill. App. 2d 145, 205 N.E.2d 643
(1965).
40 Roth v. Northern Assurance Co., 32 11. 2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 415 (1965)
Factor v. Carson, Pirie Scott Co., 393 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1968) cert. denied,
393 U.S. 836 (1968).
41 Chavez v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 78 Ill. App. 2d 53, 223 N.E.2d 220
(1966) ; Jones v. Reuss, 70 Ill. App. 2d 418, 219 N.E.2d 75 (1966).
42 Harrison v. Woyahn, 261 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1959).
43 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §273 (1967).
44 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §50(5) (1967).
45 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §72 (1967).
46 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A §§301 & 303 (1967).
47 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 57.1 (1967).
App. 2d 120, 204 N.E.2d
48 Klatt v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 55 11.
319 (1964).
49 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, §20 (1967).

Tie John .arshall Journal of Practiceand Procedure

CVol. 3:56

tives must be filed within 90 days after suggestion of death, but
the statute does not specify how soon the suggestion should be
made or how much time may elapse5u If the defendant is not
dead but absent from the state, the period of absence is not
counted in computing the time limitation. The statute itself
gives no recognition to situations where non-resident service outside the state is available but the case law tends in that direction.5 1
SUMMARY

While the law of limitations is scattered widely among
statutes and case law, chapter 83 does try to approximate something of a codification of the law. Any time limit is by its nature
arbitrary and in some instances may work a hardship. The law
of limitations represents an attempt at imposing reasonable
restrictions on the time one can take in the assertion of rights.
Giving everyone a reasonable chance at having a day in court is
balanced against the enforcement of stale or even fraudulent
claims which have become indefensible. Rules to meet all future
situations are difficult to draw if they are possible to achieve.
The piecemeal approach to the statutes and common law rules
has produced a workable pattern without too much rigidity.
Section 22.1 seems to be a valuable addition to the law of limitations introducing the "knew or should have known" criterion.
What might yet be done is to eliminate stilted and legalistic
distinctions. Neither the objectives of limitations nor the happenstance of whether death does or does not result from an injury, bears any reasonable relation to whether time limit is a
condition of liability. Similarly, the judicial criteria used to
absolve a mentally retarded person from the extended limitations
accorded minors and the mentally ill, also absolves certain classes
of teenagers and other minors from the same extended limitation.
Allowing as much as 20 or more years to elapse before requiring
litigation to be started ought to be conditioned upon a showing
of the necessity to wait so long and the practical inability to
bring suit earlier. While any specified age of reaching majority
will be artificial for some persons, the structure of modern society seems to argue strongly that minority ends at least with the
teens and many would contend that maturation occurs earlier.
Regardless of how this matter is resolved in such other areas as
voting and the like, it would seem that for purposes of limitations, the age of reaching majority could be lowered and the
litigation at the maximum period circumscribed by reasonable
conditions. In fact, srction 22.1 suggests that for an average
50 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §54 (1967).
51 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 8:,, §19 (1967).
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person 10 years is a good maximum time limit even where there
are extenuating circumstances.
Other phases of the law of lirhitations that could be tightened include the provision relating to death or absence from the
jurisdiction. As to the latter express recognition could be given
to the expanding concepts of jurisdiction over non-residents and
the statute could forbid delaying the commencement of action
on the grounds of absence where jurisdiction could be obtained
on the non-resident. Similarly, where a party dies, the suggestion of death ought to be made within a specified period of time
and the representative's letters ought to be sought within a specific time interval even where probate is not required. The time
limits need not be oppressively short when death intrudes but
they should be definite so everyone knows the limit. The failure
of the statute to specify such time limits operates in some cases
to extend indefinitely both the 90 day limit for substituting parties and the 9 month limit from issuance of letter for suing the
personal representative.
While limitations are a somewhat arbitrary criteria, the law
seems to create exceptions when the need arises. As the exceptions extend the time for specific reasons, it may be possible
to shorten the initial period prescribed in an effort to keep pace
with a fast-moving society. When the exceptions become too
numerous, a new concept of limitations may result or have to be
devised.

